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 1 Introduction 
 The policy and practice of any given state has an impact on the enjoyment of human rights 
not only on the part of people within that state’s sovereign territory. Also, often there is a 
signifi cant extraterritorial impact on people in the rest of the world. In the case of civil and 
political rights, relevant extraterritorial activity includes the conduct of warfare, occupation, 
other military action, anti- migration and anti- piracy initiatives at sea, sanctions regimes, 
extraordinary rendition, strikes by so- called ‘drones’ and the operation of extraterritorial 
detention and interrogation sites housing combatants and migrants, including refugees. 
 Domestic and international public policy concerned with the obligations of states towards 
the enjoyment of human rights by people outside their territories potentially has a legal 
dimension in international human rights treaty law.  1  However, in the fi eld of civil and politi-
 cal rights, a frequent question is raised as to whether certain activities relevant here, notably 
those associated with the US eras of George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ and President Barack 
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  1  For academic commentary on this topic, see, e.g. the sources listed at the end of this chapter, and 
Ralph Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”?: Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on 
Civil and Political Rights’, (2005) 26  MJIL 739 (Wilde 2005); Ralph Wilde, ‘Case Note,  R 
(Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust intervening)’, (2008) 102(3)  AJIL 628 
(Wilde 2008); Ralph Wilde, ‘From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: the Role 
of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Framework of 
Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers’, (2009) 31  Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
Law Review 75–132; Ralph Wilde, ‘Compliance with Human Rights Norms Extraterritorially: 
“Human Rights Imperialism”?’, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Marcelo Kohen (eds), 
 International Law and the Quest for its Implementation (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); various authors, 
 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights , adopted 28 September 2011 (Maastricht Principles); Fons Coomans and Rolf Künnemann, 
 Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Intersentia, 2012) (Coomans and Künnemann); Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin 
Scheinin and Willem van Genugten (eds),  Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP, 2013) (Langford, Vanderhole, Scheinin 
and van Genugten). 
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  2  See the discussion and sources cited in Wilde 2005 (n. 1). This issue is discussed further below, in 
section 35.5. 
  3  See Wilde 2005 (n. 1). 
  4  Due to space limitations, this chapter does not cover the extraterritorial application of non- refoulement 
obligations in refugee law and human rights law, or the obligations of international organisations. 
  5  On the extraterritorial application of economic, social and cultural rights, see e.g. Maastricht 
Principles; Coomans and Künnemann; Langford, Vanderhole, Scheinin and van Genugten, and 
sources cited therein (n. 1). 
  6  In particular, the use of the term ‘ jurisdiction’ as the trigger for applicability; see below, 
section 35.2.1. 
  7  Notably the jurisprudence relating to the European Convention on Human Rights. See below, 
section 35.2. 
  8  See below section 35.5.2. 
  9  See below section 35.5.3. 
 10  For the treaty provisions, see the sources cited in nn. 17–20, 22–26, 31 below. 
 11  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion , 
2004 ICJ 163 (9 July) ( Wall Advisory Opinion);  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (DRC v Uganda),  2005 ICJ 116 (19 December), at paras 216–17 ( DRC v Uganda ); A pplication 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian 
Federation)  Order Indicating Provisional Measures ( Georgia v Russia Provisional Measures), 15 
October 2008, available at: http://www.icj- cij.org/docket/fi les/140/14801.pdf, paras 109, 149. 
Obama’s policy of a similar nature (e.g. ‘drone’ strikes, rendition and extraterritorial deten-
tion and interrogation), take place in a ‘legal black hole’, usually taken to denote the absence 
not necessarily of all law, but of those areas of law that would provide checks and balances to 
guard against human rights abuses.  2  Whether and to what extent international human rights 
law concerned with civil and political rights (which, it is claimed, provides such checks and 
balances) applies extraterritorially is indeed contested and uncertain. The case law and 
commentary is sparse and often highly situation- specifi c, and states take varying and mutu-
ally inconsistent positions on it, from the rejection of extraterritorial application per se by 
certain states (e.g. the USA), to the willingness of certain states (e.g. in Europe) to accept the 
constraints of human rights law abroad in particular circumstances.  3  
 In this context, the present chapter addresses two fundamental interrelated questions. In 
the fi rst place, does international human rights law on civil and political rights apply extra-
territorially and, if so, on what basis and in which circumstances? In the second place, what 
is the signifi cance of some of the underlying political ideas at stake – for example, the claim 
that a ‘legal black hole’ is problematic, and needs to be remedied – for the meaning and scope 
of the law on applicability? 
 The focus is on civil and political rights only, not also on economic, social and cultural 
rights.  4  The latter set of rights also raise important issues in the extraterritorial context, and 
states are bound by international legal rules covering both sets of rights.  5  However, the law 
on the extraterritorial application of civil and political rights has important differences in 
terms of treaty provisions,  6  enjoys a signifi cant body of specifi c case law and other authorita-
tive commentary,  7  and implicates special policy questions worthy of discrete evaluation, 
notably as concerns the relationship between the individual and the state  8  and the notion of a 
‘legal black hole’.  9  
 The foregoing analysis evaluates relevant treaty provisions and how they have been inter-
preted by judicial and international expert- body decisions.  10  In particular, decisions (in their 
various forms) from the following bodies are reviewed: the International Court of Justice;  11  
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 12  General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26 May 2004) (HRC General 
Comment No. 31) para. 10;  Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay , Comm. No. 56/1979, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (29 July 1981)  (Celiberti de Casariego ), para. 10.3,  Lopez Burgos v Uruguay , 
Communication No. R.12/52, Supp. No. 40, at 176, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981) ( Lopez Burgos ), 
para. 12.3;  Mabel Perreira Montero v Uruguay (Montero ), Comm. No. 106/1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
OP/2 at 136 (1990) (31 March 1983), para. 5. 
 13  Gillow v United Kingdom , App. No. 13/1984/85/132 (ECtHR, Judgment of 23 October 1986), 
( Gillow ), para. 62;  Bui Van Thanh v United Kingdom , App. No. 16137/90 (ECtHR, Eur. Comm’n 
H.R., 12 March 1990) ( Bui Van Thanh );  WM. v Denmark , App. No. 17392/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193 (1992), 196 ( WM  );  Loizidou v Turkey , 310 ECtHR (ser. A) (1995) (Preliminary 
Objections) ( Loizidou (Preliminary Objections)), para. 62;  Loizidou v Turkey , 1996-VI, ECtHR, 
(ser. A) 2216, (GC) (Merits), ( Loizidou (Merits) ), paras 52–56;  Yonghong v Portugal , App. No. 50887/99 
(ECtHR, Judgment of 25 November 1999) ( Yonghong );  Öcalan v Turkey , App. No. 46221/99 
(ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, 14 December 2000) ( Öcalan  Admissibility Decision) and 2005-IV 
ECtHR (GC) ( Öcalan  GC);  Cyprus v Turkey , 2001-IV ECtHR, 1 (GC), at para. 77 ( Cyprus v 
Turkey );  Issa and Others v Turkey , ECtHR, Admissibility Decision of 30 May 2000 ( Issa  (Admissibility)) 
and 41 ECtHR 27 (2004) (Merits) ( Issa  (Merits)), para. 71;  Bankovi c´ v Belgium , 2001–XII ECtHR, 
333 (GC), at para. 70–71 ( Bankovi c´  );  Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia , ECtHR, App. 
No. 48787/99 (Grand Chamber), Reports 2004-VII (8 July 2004) ( Ilascu );  Solomou v Turkey , 
ECtHR, App. No. 36832/97, 24 June 2008, ( Solomou ), Paras. 43–52;  Isaak v Turkey , ECtHR, App. 
No. 44587/98, 28 Sept 2006, Admissibility, page 21 ( Isaak );  Andreou v Turkey , ECtHR, App. 
No. 45653/99, Admissibility decision, 3 June 2008 ( Andreou (Admissibility)), p. 11, and Merits, 
27 October 2009, ( Andreou  (Merits)) para. 25;  Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom , App. 
No. 61498/08 (ECtHR, Chamber decision, 2 March 2010) ( Al-Saadoon );  Al-Skeini v United Kingdom , 
App. No. 55721/07 (ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011) ( Al-Skeini (ECtHR)). 
 14  Coard v US , Case 10.951, Report No.109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.85, doc. 9 rev. (1999), ( Coard ), 
paras 37, 39, 41. 
 15  Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and 
Recommendations: United States of America , UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006), para. 15; 
General Comment No. 2:  Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties , 23 November 2007, UN doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2 (24 January 2008), para. 16. 
 16  R. v Immigration Offi cer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma Rights Centre 
and others (Appellants) [2004] UKHL 55, 9 December 2004  (Roma Rights );  R. (on the application of 
Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of state for Defence (The Redress Trust intervening) [2007] UKHL 26; 
[2007] 3 WLR 33 ( Al-Skeini (HL)); [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609 (21 December 2005) ( Al-Skeini 
 (CA)); [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), 14 December 2004, ( Al-Skeini (DC)). 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee;  12  the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights;  13  the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;  14  the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture;  15  and the courts of England and Wales.  16  
 2 Applicability provisions in human rights treaties 
 2.1 ‘Jurisdiction’ 
 Some of the main international human rights treaties addressing civil and political rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
their Protocols, the Convention against Torture (CAT), as well as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) (which also covers economic, social and cultural rights) do not 
conceive obligations simply in terms of the acts of states parties. Instead, responsibility is 
conceived in a particular context: the state’s ‘ jurisdiction’. Under the ECHR and some of its 
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 17  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov., 
1950, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR), Art. 1; ECHR Protocol No. 1 (ECHR Protocol 1), Art. 4; ECHR 
Protocol No. 6 (ECHR Protocol 6), Art. 5; ECHR Protocol No. 13 (ECHR Protocol 13), Art. 4. 
American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
UNTS 123, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (22 November 1969) (ACHR), 
Art. 1. 
 18  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
GA Res. 46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/39/51, 10 December 1984, 1465 
UNTS 85 (CAT), Art. 2. 
 19  Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. No. 49, UN 
Doc. A/44/49 (20 November 1989), 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC), Art. 2.1. 
 20  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A/XXI, 16 December 1966, 
UN Doc. A/6316 (19 December 1966), 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), Art. 2. 
 21  See section 35.2.2. 
 22  ECHR, Art. 56 (formerly 63) (n. 17); ECHR Protocol No. 1, Art. 4 (n. 17); ECHR Protocol No. 6 
(n. 17), Art. 5; ECHR Protocol No. 13 (n. 17), Art. 4; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9 December 1948, UNTS, vol. 78, p. 277 
(Genocide Convention) Art. 25. 
 23  International Convention with the Object of Securing the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade, 
Geneva, 25 September 1926, LNTS, vol. 60, p. 253, as amended by the Protocol Amending the 
Slavery Convention, approved by GA Res. 794 (VIII) of 23 October 1953, entered into force on 
7 December 1953 (1926 Slavery Convention) Art. 9. 
 24  Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, Supplementary to the International Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926, 
Geneva, 7 September 1956 (1956 Supplemental Slavery Convention), Art. 12(1). 
Protocols and the ACHR, the state is obliged to ‘secure’ the rights contained in the treaty 
within its ‘ jurisdiction’.  17  Under the CAT, the state is obliged to take measures to prevent acts 
of torture ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’.  18  Under the CRC, states parties are obliged 
to ‘respect and ensure’ the rights in the treaty to ‘each child within their jurisdiction’.  19  
The ICCPR formulation is slightly different from the others in that applicability operates in 
relation to those ‘within [the state’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction’.  20  
 Thus a nexus to the state – termed ‘ jurisdiction’ – has to be established before its obliga-
tions are in play (the signifi cance of the separate reference to ‘territory’ in the ICCPR will be 
considered below  21  ). 
 2.2 Colonial extension clauses 
 Several early human rights treaties, for example the ECHR (and some of its subsequent 
Protocols) and the 1948 Genocide Convention contain a ‘colonial clause’ allowing the states 
parties to make a declaration that the rights contained in the treaty will apply in ‘territories 
for whose international relations it is responsible’, a term referring to colonial and (UN) 
Trusteeship territories, now in the case of the former (there are no more Trusteeship territo-
ries) sometimes referred to using alternative euphemistic terminology such as ‘dependencies’ 
or ‘overseas territories’.  22  Similarly, the 1926 Slavery Convention contains an ‘opt- out’ clause 
which allows states parties to declare that their acceptance of the Convention does not bind 
some of the territories placed under their jurisdiction,  23  whilst the 1956 Supplementary 
Slavery Convention, although providing that ‘[t]his Convention shall apply to all non 
self- governing, trust, colonial and other non- metropolitan territories for the international 
relations of which any State Party is responsible’, requires states parties to specify to which 
territories the Convention applies.  24  
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 25  American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, 1948, OAS Res. XXX (1948) (American 
Declaration); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 
27 June 1981) (ACHPR); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, New York, 18 December 1979, UNTS, vol. 1249, p. 13 (CEDAW); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD or 
CERD) Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX), 21 December 1965; Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Confl ict of 2000 (CRC Optional Protocol). 
 26  CERD Art. 3 (n. 25). 
 27  CERD Arts 6 (domestic remedies), 14.1 ( jurisdiction of the Committee) (n. 25). 
 28  Coard , para. 37 (n. 14). 
 29  DRC v Uganda , paras 216–17 (n. 11). 
 The question of whether, in each case, a territorial unit covered by such clauses falls 
within, or outside, the sovereign territory of the states party to human rights treaties is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. In the case of territories in the former category, the clauses 
are concerned with the scope of application within a state’s territory; in the case of territories 
in the latter category, they determine extraterritorial applicability. Similar colonial extension 
clauses were not included in later human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the CRC and 
the CAT. Whether, for those other treaties that do have a colonial extension clause, the ‘ juris-
diction’ test can trigger applicability in overseas territories as an alternative to the operation 
of the extension clause is addressed below. 
 2.3 No general applicability provision: American Declaration, African Charter, 
CEDAW and CERD 
 Certain other international human rights instruments do not contain a general provision, 
whether using the term ‘ jurisdiction’ or something else equivalent, stipulating the scope of 
applicability of the obligations they contain: the 1948 (Inter-) American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (not a treaty), the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD or CERD), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Confl ict of 2000.  25  
 In the case of the CERD, a sub- set of obligations are conceived in the context of the state’s 
‘ jurisdiction’. The obligation concerning racial segregation and apartheid applies to parties 
with respect to ‘territories under their jurisdiction’.  26  Similarly, the provision of remedies 
operates with respect to people in the state’s ‘ jurisdiction’, in terms of both the obligation 
borne by the state to provide such remedies itself, and the jurisdiction of the international 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, if it has been accepted, to hear 
complaints against parties.  27  
 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has treated the American Declaration 
as if it does contain the ‘ jurisdiction’ trigger, without an explanation for this assumption.  28  
Similarly, the International Court of Justice appeared to treat the African Charter and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Confl ict of 2000 as if they contained the ‘ jurisdiction’ trigger, again 
without any explanation.  29  
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 30  See, e.g., James Crawford,  Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law  (2012), ch. 21, and sources 
cited therein. 
 31  Bankovic´  , paras 59–61 (n. 13). 
 32  Loizidou (Preliminary Objections), para. 62;  Loizidou (Merits), paras 52–56 (n. 13), See also  Cyprus 
v Turkey , para. 77 (n. 13) . 
 33  HRC General Comment No. 31, para. 10 (n. 12). 
 34  See the sources cited in nn. 10, 13–15 above. 
 35  Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 113 (n. 11);  DRC v Uganda , paras 216–17 (n. 11). 
 3 Extraterritorial meaning of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in human 
rights treaties 
 3.1 Relevance of the international law meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ 
 An area of international law also named ‘ jurisdiction’ exists separately from international 
human rights law.  30  The international law concept of ‘ jurisdiction’ is concerned with rules 
prescribing the particular circumstances where a state is legally permitted to exercise its legal 
authority – for example prescriptive, enforcement or adjudicative – over a particular situation, 
such as prosecuting its own nationals for crimes committed abroad. 
 In the  Bankovi c´ decision concerning the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights seemed to suggest that the meaning of 
‘ jurisdiction’ in the ECHR should somehow refl ect the meaning of that term in public inter-
national law generally.  31  However, insofar as the Court intended make such a suggestion, it 
does not fi t with how the Court and other authoritative bodies have approached the issue in 
other decisions, where extraterritorial jurisdiction has been defi ned as simply a factual test, 
without the additional normative consideration of whether or not the activity under consid-
eration constitutes a lawful exercise of jurisdiction as a matter of general international law. For 
example, the Court held that Turkey’s presence in Northern Cyprus constituted the exercise 
of jurisdiction for ECHR purposes because of the nature of control exercised, stressing that 
such jurisdiction could subsist on this basis regardless of the legality of the exercise of control.  32  
 As for the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a passage that can be inter-
preted as alluding to the relevance of the legality of extraterritorial action to the question of 
whether such action is regulated by the Covenant, stated in General Comment No. 31 that 
the principle of making available the enjoyment of Covenant rights to all individuals regard-
less of nationality, ‘applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a 
State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power 
or effective control was obtained’.  33  
 3.2 Whether or not ‘jurisdiction’ can have an extraterritorial meaning at all 
 The consistent jurisprudence and authoritative statements of the relevant international human 
rights review bodies and the International Court of Justice regarding the ECHR, the ACHR 
and the CAT has been to interpret the term ‘ jurisdiction’ in these treaties as operating extra-
territorially in certain circumstances.  34  
 Although there is less authoritative commentary on the extraterritorial applicability of the 
CRC, the meaning of ‘ jurisdiction’ in this treaty is arguably similar. The International Court 
of Justice appeared to assume so in affi rming the applicability of this treaty to Israel’s presence 
in the Palestinian territories in the  Wall  Advisory Opinion, and to Uganda in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the  DRC v Uganda  judgment.  35  
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 36  On the ACHPR and the CRC Optional Protocol (n. 25), see  DRC v Uganda , paras 216–17 (n. 11). 
 37  Coard , para. 37 (n. 14). 
 38  ICCPR, Art. 2 (n. 20). 
 39  In the  Wall  Advisory Opinion (n. 11); and HRC General Comment No. 31 (n. 12). 
 40  Cyprus v Turkey (n. 13);  Loizidou  (Preliminary Objections) (Merits) (n. 13);  Bankovic´  (n. 13); 
 Al-Skeini  (DC), (CA), (HL), (ECtHR) (nn. 13, 16);  Issa (n. 13);  Wall  Advisory Opinion (n. 11); 
 DRC v Uganda (n. 11). 
 The aforementioned treatment by the International Court of Justice of the applicability of 
the ACHPR and the Optional Protocol to the CRC, in terms of whether situations at issue 
constituted the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction’ (despite that term not being used in these instru-
ments), was a part of the Court’s affi rmation that these instruments were capable of extrater-
ritorial application on this basis.  36  Similarly, the aforementioned treatment of the applicability 
of the (Inter-) American Declaration by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
in terms of the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction’ was in the context of extraterritorial activity, which 
it regarded as capable of constituting the exercise of jurisdiction and thereby falling under the 
scope of the obligations in the Declaration.  37  
 As mentioned earlier, the ICCPR provision on scope of application addresses those ‘within 
[the state’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction’.  38  By including the word ‘territory’ 
in addition to ‘ jurisdiction’, it might be read to suggest that jurisdiction is limited to 
territory, thereby ruling out extraterritorial applicability. However, this position is diffi cult 
to sustain given the affi rmation of extraterritorial applicability by the International Court of 
Justice and the UN Human Rights Committee.  39  An absolutist denial of extraterritorial 
applicability not only lacks support in, but also is rejected by, the jurisprudence and other 
authoritative interpretations on this issue. The key question has not been whether human 
rights law treaty obligations apply extraterritorially, but, rather, in what circumstances this 
occurs. 
 As will be explained, the term has been understood in the extraterritorial context as a 
connection between the state, on the one hand, and either the territory in which the relevant 
acts took place – referred to herein as a  spatial  or  territorial connection – or the individual 
affected by them – referred to herein as a  personal, individual  or, because of the type of 
state action involved,  state- agent-authority connection. Within these two categories, there is 
considerable uncertainty due to the sparse nature of case law and a variety of views taken by 
states, interpretative/enforcement bodies such as courts, and expert commentators. 
 3.3 Jurisdiction trigger (1): territorial control 
 3.3.1 General concept 
 Extraterritorial jurisdiction understood spatially conceives obligations as fl owing from the 
fact of effective control over territory. This approach was articulated in decisions relating to 
the aforementioned  Cyprus v Turkey case, the  Loizidou case regarding the same situation, the 
aformentioned  Bankovi c´ and  Al-Skeini cases, and the  Issa case concerning Turkey in Iraq, all 
before the European Court of Human Rights (and also the courts of England and Wales as 
far as  Al-Skeini is concerned). It is also adopted, to a certain extent, in the  Wall Advisory 
Opinion and the  DRC v Uganda judgment of the International Court of Justice.  40  
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 41  Loizidou ( Merits ), para. 56 (n. 13). 
 42  See also  Cyprus v Turkey , para. 77 (n. 13). 
 43  See also  Cyprus v Turkey , para. 77, (n. 13);  Isaak, p. 20 (n. 13);  Solomou , p. 47 (n. 13). 
 44  Bankovi c´ , para. 46 and 47 (n. 13). 
 45  See also  Bankovi c´ , para. 75 (n. 13). 
 46  Bankovi c´ , paras 75–76 (n. 13). 
 47  Issa , para. 76 (n. 13). 
 48  Al-Skeini (CA), para. 198 (Lord Justice Sedley) (n. 16). 
 3.3.2 Effective ‘overall’ control of a distinct entity/regime 
 In one of its judgments in the  Loizidou  case, the European Court of Human Rights empha-
sised that Turkey exercised effective control operating ‘overall’; in such circumstances, it was 
unnecessary to identify whether the exercise of control was detailed.  41  So if the state is in 
effective overall control of a territorial unit, everything within that unit falls within its ‘ juris-
diction’, even if at lesser levels powers are exercised by other actors (e.g. if particular activities 
are devolved to other states or local actors).  42  The exercise of this type of control also leads to 
a generalised obligation to secure the ‘entire range of substantive rights’ in the area in 
question.  43  
 3.3.3 Can it be a sliding scale depending on the level of control? 
 In the  Bankovi c´ case, the applicants claimed that ‘ jurisdiction’ under Article 1 of the ECHR 
could be said to exist on the basis of effective territorial control to the extent that such control 
was in fact exercised, and that, accordingly, in the words of the European Court of Human 
Rights, ‘the extent of the positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to secure 
Convention rights would be proportionate to the level of control in fact exercised’.  44  This 
might be understood to suggest a ‘sliding scale’ or ‘cause and effect’ concept of jurisdiction 
based on territorial control: obligations apply insofar as control is exercised; their nature and 
scope is set in proportional relation to the level of control.  45  
 The European Court of Human Rights rejected this argument; it held that the concept of 
jurisdiction could not be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the particular circum-
stances of the extra- territorial act in question’.  46  However, in the later  Issa decision of 2004, 
the Court, having concluded that Turkey did not exercise ‘overall control’ in the area of 
Northern Iraq in question, did not end its consideration of whether the Turkish presence 
constituted the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction’. Rather, it went on to consider ‘whether at the rele-
vant time Turkish troops conducted operations in the area where the killings took place’.  47  
The assumption was that if the troops had been doing this, which the Court found on the 
facts they had not, jurisdiction would have subsisted. Unfortunately, the Court failed to indi-
cate whether at this stage it was considering extraterritorial jurisdiction defi ned as territorial 
control (as opposed to the alternative defi nition based on control over individuals), but if it 
was, one might discern a more receptive attitude towards the broader cause- and-effect 
concept than in the earlier dictum in  Bankovi c´ . 
 This concept was picked up in the English Court of Appeal stage of the  Al-Skeini case by 
Lord Justice Sedley, who considered the idea that applicability might depend not on ‘enforce-
ability as a whole’ but ‘whether it lay within the power of the occupying force to avoid or 
remedy the particular breach in issue’.  48  Although he acknowledged that this was blocked by 
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 49  Ibid. paras 201–02. The idea of dividing and tailoring was criticised at the House of Lords stage. See 
in particular  Al-Skeini (HL) paras 79–80 (Lord Rodger) and 128–30 (Lord Brown) (n. 16). 
 50  Bankovi c´ , paras 75–76 (n. 13). 
 51  Andreou (Merits), para. 25 (n. 13). 
the  Bankovi c´ dictum, he rejected the underlying logic of the dictum and suggested that the 
European Court of Human Rights might sooner or later revisit it.  49  Indeed, there is possibly 
a further approach to jurisdiction defi ned spatially (considered in section 35.3.3.4 immedi-
ately below), and other approaches regarding the alternative trigger for jurisdiction as control 
over individuals (considered in section 35.3.4.3 below), which may offer greater opportuni-
ties for the kind of fl exibility considered here. 
 3.3.4 Does it cover bombing/shooting? 
 In the  Bankovi c´ decision, the European Court of Human Rights rejected applicability of the 
ECHR in the context of the NATO bombing of a radio and TV station in Belgrade, holding 
that aerial bombardment did not constitute the exercise of territorial control so as meet the 
test for the territorial/spatial concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  50  
 The  Andreou v Turkey case concerned soldiers of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
located on the TRNC side of the neutral UN buffer zone between the TRNC and the rest 
of Cyprus, who shot into the buffer zone and hit the applicant, Mrs Andreou, who had moved 
in this area. The European Court of Human Rights held that Mrs Andreou came within 
Turkey’s extraterritorial jurisdiction because:
 even though the applicant sustained her injuries in territory over which Turkey exercised 
no control, the opening of fi re on the crowd from close range, which was the direct and 
immediate cause of those injuries, was such that the applicant must be regarded as ‘within 
[the] jurisdiction’ of Turkey.  51  
 As established in the aforementioned earlier decisions about Northern Cyprus, the TRNC 
side of the buffer zone from which the shots were fi red constituted Turkish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR on the basis of effective territorial control. The 
Court focused on the act performed in this space – ‘the opening of fi re’ – as being the deter-
minative act, rather than its effect, which took place outside Turkish extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, on the Greek side. The Court did not, then, consider whether shooting per se constituted 
an exercise of jurisdiction, since the territory from which the shot fi red already constituted 
extraterritorial Turkish jurisdiction for a different reason. 
 This fi nding raises the possibility that a continuous act that starts in the state’s jurisdiction, 
whether territorial or extraterritorial, will be covered by human rights law in its entirety, 
including if the end point is, as here, more generally extraterritorial jurisdiction. Revisiting 
 Bankovi c´ , it might be asked whether bombing which is initiated from the state’s jurisdiction, 
for example missiles launched from state territory which land extraterritorially, or aircraft 
located outside the jurisdiction when the bombing mechanism is operated from within the 
jurisdiction (such as in the case of remotely operated aircraft, so- called ‘drones’) would be 
covered by human rights obligations. 
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 53  Ilascu , para. 392 (n. 13). 
 54  Celiberti de Casariego , para. 10.3 (n. 12); Lopez Burgos , para. 12.3 (n. 12);  Öcalan (GC), para. 91 (n. 13). 
 55  Isaak , ‘Admissiblity’, page 21 (n. 13). 
 3.3.5 The looser test of effective authority/decisive infl uence from  Ilascu 
 The  Ilascu  decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in 2004 
concerned complaints of violations of the ECHR by the authorities of the Moldovan Republic 
of Transdniestria (MRT), an entity in the territory of Moldova which had declared its inde-
pendence in 1992–93, with Russian support, and was not recognised as an independent state 
by other states. The applicants argued that Moldova was responsible because what they 
complained of took place in Moldovan territory, and Russia was responsible because it was 
supporting the breakaway MRT.  52  
 As far as Russian responsibility was concerned, the Court held that:
 [the MRT] set up in 1991–92 with the support of the Russian Federation, vested with 
organs of power and its own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at 
the very least under the decisive infl uence, of the Russian Federation, and in any event 
that it survives by virtue of the military, economic, fi nancial and political support given 
to it by the Russian Federation.  53  
 In consequence, the acts complained of fell within the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction 
by Russia. The test of ‘effective authority . . . or at the very least . . . decisive infl uence’, or 
‘in any event’ survival ‘by virtue of . . . support’ suggests a much wider defi nition of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction than the earlier decisions on this issue. It is broad enough to 
cover the behavior of a state within its own territory exclusively. Moreover, it suggests a test 
for causation that is very loose. Authorities in a range of places could meaningfully be 
described as surviving by virtue of the support from, and/or being subject to the decisive 
infl uence of, other states. It remains to be seen whether this broader test is picked up in future 
decisions. 
 3.4 Jurisdiction trigger (2): control over individuals 
 3.4.1 Introduction 
 The second main trigger for extraterritorial jurisdiction concerns control over individuals. 
This is referred to herein and in some of the relevant judicial decisions as a  personal, individual 
 or, because of the type of state action involved,  state- agent-authority connection. This con -
nection has been understood variously as  control (like the spatial relationship discussed 
already),  power or  authority . This test has been held to be met, triggering the applicability of 
human rights obligations, in the context of extraterritorial abductions (the  Celiberti de 
Casariego and  Lopez Burgos decisions by the UN Human Rights Committee and the  Öcalan 
 decisions by the European Court of Human Rights),  54  lethal physical violence by public 
agents (the  Isaak decision by the European Court of Human Rights),  55  detention of indi-
viduals (the  Coard  decision by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the 
 Al-Skeini and  Al-Saadoon decisions of the English courts and the European Court of Human 
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Rights)  56  presence in an embassy (the  WM  decision of the European Commission of Human 
Rights)  57  and the issuance of a passport (the  Montero decision by the UN Human Rights 
Committee).  58  
 3.4.2 Narrower and broader notions of control over individuals 
 In the domestic proceedings in the  Al-Skeini case concerning UK forces in Iraq, a distinction 
emerged between two different conceptions – narrow or broad – of the ‘control over indi-
viduals’ test. The narrow basis defi nes this trigger for jurisdiction extraterritorially as covering 
control exercised over individuals only in state- run facilities such as ships, embassies and, as 
affi rmed in  Al-Skeini in the English courts, detention facilities.  59  The broad basis, by contrast, 
defi nes this trigger as such control short of any state- run facility context, in any situation. 
 The distinction between these conceptions of the individual/state agent authority basis for 
extraterritorial ‘ jurisdiction’ was moot in  Al-Skeini because the relevant situation under eval-
uation in that case fell within the narrower test (it concerned the torture and killing of an 
individual held in a UK military base). The distinction is potentially relevant, however, to 
other situations. 
 None of the pre- Al-Skeini Strasbourg decisions concerned with the ‘individual’ heading of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, even if sometimes covering situations taking place in state- run 
facilities, affi rmed a requirement of such a location as being part of the test for applicability.  60  
Nonetheless, in the English courts, the narrower version of the test – with the requirement 
– ultimately prevailed in the fi nal decision at the House of Lords (as it was then).  61  When a 
different aspect of the case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Court engaged in a general review of the law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, and in its obser-
vations on its previous case law on the ‘individual’ trigger, stated that it did not consider that 
jurisdiction arose in the decisions under evaluation:
 solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or 
ship in which the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of 
physical power and control over the person in question.  62  
 This suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be understood to subsist simply because 
the state operates facilities abroad – there has to be ‘physical power and control’ exercised over 
individuals within those facilities in order for such treatment to be regulated by the 
Convention. What is left open is whether the exercise of such power outside state- run facili-
ties would also be covered. Moreover, it is unclear what the caveat amounts to – what exactly 
would fall within, and outside, the boundaries of the test – in the context of state- run facili-
ties, and how this approach is reconciled with the fi nding in the  WM  case, which concerned 
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the mere physical presence in an Embassy, without any reference to additional, more direct 
‘physical power and control’.  63  
 Perhaps the Court had in mind a different consideration: that states should not ordinarily 
be made responsible for the human rights of all individuals within their foreign premises, 
simply by virtue of presence on such premises – there has to be a more direct connection to 
a rights violation, which is established through the requirement of physical power and control. 
Such a consideration is, however, about the substance of rights and obligations, not whether 
they should be applicable. Specifi cally, it seeks to secure negative rights concerned with non- 
interference exclusively, without also the broader provision of positive rights. 
 3.4.3 Being shot renders an individual within the jurisdiction? 
 A 2008 decision of the European Court of Human Rights appears to suggest that merely 
being subject to lethal armed force could be suffi cient to fall within the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the state responsible for that action. At the same event in and around the UN 
buffer zone in between the TRNC and the rest of Cyprus which led to the aforementioned 
shooting of Mrs Andreou, another Greek Cypriot, Solomos Solomou, broke through the UN 
cordon from the Greek side into the UN buffer zone, crossed in to the TRNC side of the 
buffer zone, and climbed a fl agpole, to protest at the Turkish occupation of the north.  64  He 
was hit by shots fi red from the TRNC side of the buffer zone.  65  This might have been treated 
as taking place within Turkish jurisdiction on the basis of effective overall control of the 
TRNC. However, curiously the European Court of Human Rights focused on not the 
opening of fi re, but the experience of being shot, treating this as an exercise of state agent 
control.  66  The emphasis was thus on control exercised over the individual, rather than on 
control exercised over the territory within which the individual and/or the soldiers are 
located. In the context of the case, the only direct nexus of control is being in receipt of a 
lethal bullet. Indeed, it is logical to conclude that a concept of effective control over indi-
viduals that has been found to encompass abduction (as mentioned, in the  Lopez Burgos  and 
 Celiberti de Casariego decisions) would also cover lethal armed force (and, indeed, a contrary 
conclusion would be perverse). 
 The other decisions on bombing and shooting –  Bankovi c´ and  Andreou – ultimately 
turned on whether the bombing and shooting in question took place in foreign- state-
controlled territory, or themselves constituted the exercise of such territorial control by 
the states involved. The shift away from territory to the individual in  Solomou suggests a 
new approach to the applicability of human rights law to such action, with potentially 
broad consequences. If it is possible to bring this action within the ‘individual’ heading of 
jurisdiction, whether or not the alternative ‘territorial’ basis for applicability is met is no 
longer exclusively determinative of applicability. Even if the ‘sliding scale’ or ‘cause and effect’ 
conception of jurisdiction as control over territory is supposedly ruled out by  Bankovi c´ 
(a conclusion which is, as mentioned, placed in question by  Issa ), a test of jurisdiction as 
control over individuals understood in this way would be suffi cient to trigger human rights 
obligations. 
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 3.5 A new hybrid test from  Al-Skeini ? 
 The  Al-Skeini decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 2011 introduces a 
treatment of extraterritorial jurisdiction that appears to combine both the ‘territorial’ and 
‘individual’ triggers that had hitherto been treated separately. The decision concerned the 
shooting of individuals by UK soldiers in streets and houses where the soldiers were tempo-
rarily present, in the context of the broader UK military presence in Iraq. The Court placed 
emphasis on the fact that the United Kingdom:
 assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a 
sovereign government. In particular, the United Kingdom assumed authority and 
responsibility for the maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these exceptional 
circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers 
engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question, exercised 
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so 
as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.  67  
 This leaves open the question of whether killing outside the broader context of the territori-
ally defi ned exercise of authority and responsibility would be suffi cient to establish a jurisdic-
tional link. There is no specifi c reference to such a broader role in  Solomou ; but an equivalent 
activity by Turkey in northern Cyprus had already been determined to exist, and to consti-
tute the exercise of jurisdiction, in the earlier, canonical cases relating to that situation. 
 3.6 No trigger – what if no exercise of jurisdiction in own territory? 
 In the  Ilascu case mentioned earlier, the Court was asked to determine both Russian and 
Moldovan responsibility for the acts of the MRT authorities. As far as Moldova was concerned, 
the issue was not extraterritorial applicability – the MRT was part of Moldovan territory, 
even if it was a breakaway republic – but whether the loss of control within that territory 
somehow altered the understanding of jurisdiction for the purposes of applying the Convention 
as far as Moldova was concerned. 
 This implicates a broader issue: should jurisdiction always be assumed to exist within a 
state’s territory? How is this reconciled with notions of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
territorial control, which make the foreign state obliged to implement all the rights in the 
treaty in a generalised sense? Is the host state nonetheless also responsible for doing the same 
thing with respect to its obligations? 
 In  Ilascu , the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that there was 
a ‘presumption’ that jurisdiction is exercised normally throughout state territory, but that:
 This presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances, particularly where a 
state is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory. That may be as a 
result of military occupation by the armed forces of another state which effectively 
controls the territory concerned . . . acts of war or rebellion, or the acts of a foreign state 
supporting the installation of a separatist state within the territory of the state concerned.  68  
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 This suggests that in some instances a fi nding of the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction 
on the part of one state will necessarily denote (whether or not it is addressed) some sort of 
diminution in the liability for securing rights in the territorial jurisdiction for another state. 
The Grand Chamber also concluded that:
 even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has 
a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, 
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with inter-
national law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.  69  
 This is signifi cant because it suggests a ‘sliding scale’ of territorial jurisdiction – the state must 
do what it can – which the Court in  Bankovic´  had appeared to reject  extraterritorially  as far as 
the test based on territorial control was concerned. It might be speculated that this refl ects a 
greater need to subject the state to obligations in its own territory and with respect to its own 
nationals (most of whom reside in that territory and few of whom reside extraterritorially). 
But such a need relates to what the obligations mean in substance rather than whether they 
apply. As with what was mentioned earlier regarding the dictum from  Al-Skeini on the exer-
cise of physical power and control over individuals in state- run facilities, the distinction 
between applicability and the meaning of substantive obligations (here, it seems, they should 
be limited to positive obligations) is blurred. 
 3.7 Does the ‘jurisdiction’ clause apply as an alternative basis for extraterritorial 
applicability for treaties with ‘colonial’ clauses? 
 It will be recalled that certain early human rights treaties, notably the ECHR and its Protocols, 
contain a ‘colonial clause’ through which states parties can declare that they will extend the 
rights in the treaties to their colonies. In many cases, states that had and/or still have such 
overseas territories exercised and/or exercise the degree of control over such territories and/
or the people within them on an individual level so as to meet the ‘ jurisdiction’ test for appli-
cability contained in separate clauses of the ECHR and its Protocols. This raises the question 
as to whether these treaties would apply on ‘ jurisdictional’ grounds even if a ‘colonial clause’ 
declaration has  not been made. 
 This issue came before the European Court of Human Rights in two cases related to 
Macau and Hong Kong before the handovers to China, when these territories were subject to 
Portuguese and UK sovereignty. The European Court of Human Rights held that for over-
seas territories, the only way ECHR obligations can apply is through a ‘colonial clause’ 
declaration.  70  
 This position on the exclusive determinacy of ‘colonial clause’ extension or non- extension 
as far as applicability is concerned creates the potential for a divergent situation under the 
ECHR and its Protocols when compared with the ICCPR, because of the different basis on 
which those treaties apply extraterritorially. Given the overlap in the rights covered as 
between the ECHR and its Protocols, on the one hand, and the ICCPR, on the other, a situ-
ation may arise where the nature of the state action in an overseas territory meets the juris-
dictional test, and on the facts impacts on the enjoyment of a particular right common to both 
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sets of treaties, but only the obligation in the ICCPR applies because the state has not made 
an express extension of the relevant part of the ECHR or its Protocols. 
 4 Treaties with free- standing models of applicability: approaches 
from CEDAW and CERD 
 Earlier it was explained that in the case of some of the human rights instruments that have a 
conception of scope of application or responsibility not linked to the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction’ 
(i.e. a ‘free-standing’ conception), the treaties have nonetheless been treated for the purposes 
of extraterritorial applicability as if they contained the ‘ jurisdiction’ provision. This was the 
approach taken by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as far as the (Inter-) 
American Declaration on Human Rights was concerned, and the International Court of 
Justice as far as the ACHPR and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Confl ict of 2000 were concerned. 
 A second approach to the extraterritorial scope of treaties with a free- standing conception 
of applicability provisions is simpler. It was adopted by the UK House of Lords (as it was then) 
in the  Roma Rights  case of 2004 concerning the posting of UK immigration offi cials at Prague 
airport, a policy intended to prevent individuals from travelling to the United Kingdom who 
would then make a claim for refugee protection there.  71  The complainants argued that the 
offi cials applied the immigration regulations in a manner that discriminated against the 
Roma people, and therefore constituted unlawful racial discrimination. Lady Hale, in her 
conclusions on discrimination with which the majority agreed, seemed to assume that the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race in CERD applied extraterritorially,  72  and 
Lord Steyn in the same decision held that the discriminatory nature of the UK immigration 
operation at Prague Airport involved a ‘breach’ of the United Kingdom’s obligations under 
CERD.  73  Both judges appeared to assume applicability, without recourse to a particular 
factual doctrine such as the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction’ which had to be met in order for the 
obligations to be in play.  
 The effect of the International Court of Justice’s 1998 order for provisional measures in the 
 Georgia v Russia  case is to offer further support to this ‘free- standing’ approach to applica-
bility. The Court held that the CERD provisions at issue ‘appear to apply’ extraterritorially 
because there is no express restriction on territorial application in relation to either the treaty 
generally or the provisions at issue in particular.  74  The Court’s Order called upon ‘Both 
Parties, within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia’ to take certain acts 
to comply with the Convention, a determination that assumed the extraterritorial application 
of CERD to Russian forces in Georgia.  75  
 This decision offers a particular approach to understanding the extraterritorial application 
of treaties such as the CERD which have free- standing models of applicability not expressly 
qualifi ed by jurisdiction: the absence of a restriction on applicability, whether of a general 
character, or specifi c to the particular obligations in the treaty at issue, should be taken 
to suggest that the provisions  should  apply. In other words, as far as the signifi cance of 
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treaty provisions is concerned, the enquiry on extraterritorial applicability depends on not 
establishing this in a positive sense, but, rather, establishing whether it has been ruled out 
negatively though restrictive provisions. Such an approach to treaties with free- standing 
provisions can be seen as offering a potential explanation for the approach adopted by the 
UK House of Lords in  Roma Rights,  and a general doctrine to be followed in relation to such 
treaties, as an alternative to the approach of reading a concept of ‘ jurisdiction’ into them. 
 5 Broader normative ideas and their relevance to the 
legal framework 
 5.1 Introduction 
 As with any area of law, the question of whether and to what extent international human 
rights law on civil and political rights should and does apply extraterritoriality implicates 
broader political ideas. Considering these ideas has the potential to deepen understandings 
of the debates around the value and the meaning of the legal framework. The merit of 
such an approach is acute when, as is the case here, the very applicability of the law itself is in 
question. The following section addresses the relevance of two broader sets of normative 
ideas: fi rst, those concerned with the political relationship between the individual and the 
state as it is understood in human rights law and, second, those associated with the notion of 
a ‘legal black hole’. 
 5.2 The political relationship between the individual and the state 
 Political ideas about the relationship between the individual and the state place into question 
assumptions that underpin certain important general concepts of international human 
rights law, when the operation of these concepts is considered in the extraterritorial context. 
The ideas at issue concern the state’s existential claim to legitimacy insofar as it exercises 
control over its citizens and the territory in which they live and over which the state enjoys 
sovereignty. Although international human rights law is ostensibly concerned not with 
the relationship between the state and its nationals exclusively (although some political 
rights in particular are), but, rather, the state and all individuals in its ‘ jurisdiction’,  76  an 
assumption that jurisdiction is usually exercised in a state’s territory, and that most individuals 
there are the state’s own nationals, would seem to explain approaches to the substance of 
the law, referred to further below, which assume, reference and depend on the state’s claim 
to legitimacy in the particular context of its own sovereign territory and nationals. How, 
then, should human rights be understood in the light of the profoundly different political 
basis on which a state acts extraterritorially – outside its sovereign territory, and in a context 
where most, if not all individuals affected by its acts, are non- nationals – where ideas of 
the legitimacy of its presence are understood very differently compared to ideas underpinning 
the political basis for its actions at ‘home’? The signifi cance of this general question is 
illustrated through the following three examples of different aspects of international human 
rights law. 
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Universal Standards’, (1999) 31  INT’L L. & POL. 843, 844–45 and sources cited therein. 
 78  On such remedies generally, see e.g. Dinah Shelton,  Remedies in International Human Rights Law 
 (OUP, 2006) and sources cited therein. 
 79  On the legal obligation to provide a domestic remedy, see, e.g. ICCPR, Art. 2, para. 3(a), ECHR, 
Art. 13 (nn. 20 and 17 respectively). On the exhaustion of domestic remedies as an admissibility 
requirement for a case to be heard before an international complaints mechanism, see e.g. (First) 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, opened for 
signature 16 Dec. 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976 (ICCPR Optional Protocol 1), Art. 2; 
ECHR, Art. 35, para. 1 (n. 17). 
 5.2.1 Deference to the state, including the ‘margin of appreciation’ 
 In the fi rst place, the substantive rules of international human rights law often incorporate a 
degree of deference to the state’s own determination of local cultural and societal traditions 
when accommodation to these traditions is accepted as a legitimate limitation on human 
rights, such as in the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine particularly associated with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  77  Such ideas necessarily assume and depend on 
political concepts about the particular link between the state and the people in its territory. 
How should such ideas be understood when the state acts abroad, and the political link 
between it and the people affected by its actions is of a different character? 
 5.2.2 Remedies 
 In the second place, the extraterritorial context raises distinct questions about the character of 
remedies for human rights violations.  78  The conventional wisdom in international human 
rights law is that there should be an effective ‘domestic remedy’ for such violations, and that 
the primary means through which the remedy is realised is through the state’s legal system, 
with international human rights complaint mechanisms performing a subsidiary role to 
provide a remedy as a last resort (usually requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as an 
admissibility requirement).  79  The application of this requirement in the extraterritorial 
context implicates broader constitutional theories about the role of national courts in oper-
ating checks and balances against the executive. 
 Such theories emphasise the ideas of legitimacy that underpin the function of the courts in 
challenging the executive, rooted in part in the role they play as part of a constitutional 
system within the state, aimed ultimately at protecting that state and its people. They fore-
ground the potential for tensions to arise when national courts are called up on to adjudicate 
conformity to human rights standards by the executive branch of their state when it is acting 
abroad, outside the overall polity and national population the courts and the executive 
form part of and serve. By the same token, they also draw attention to the tensions that exist 
with the idea of national courts of one state operating as a ‘domestic remedy’ in relation to a 
foreign state acting in the territorial space within which these courts operate. Ultimately, 
they place into question the primacy accorded to a domestic remedy, and the subsidiary status 
given to an international remedy, in the context of a violation of human rights law 
extraterritorially. 
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 5.2.3 Emergencies/derogations in the extraterritorial context 
 In the third place, the political and legal mismatch between the identity of the state acting 
extraterritorially, and the identity of the people and territory in which it is acting, has impor-
tant implications for normative concepts crafted to regulate the circumstances in which a state 
can and should be permitted take ‘emergency’ measures limiting rights when its survival is 
threatened. Certain international human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR and the ECHR, 
enshrine these concepts in ‘derogation’ provisions.  80  
 There is a question as to whether or not the test for activating a derogation – the existence 
of a ‘public emergency’ (ICCPR) or ‘war or other public emergency’ (ECHR) which 
‘threatens’ (ICCPR)/is ‘threatening’ (ECHR) the ‘life of the nation’ (both instruments) 
covers all forms of extraterritorial security threats in relation to which a derogation would be 
needed in order for necessary responsive action to be compatible with human rights law.  81  
The question arises because of the reference to the ‘life of the nation’. If that nation is defi ned 
as the foreign state acting extraterritorially (and the nationals it claims to act on behalf of ), 
and not also the state/non- state territory in which it is acting, and the affected population, 
does the test only cover threats extraterritorially which can be linked back to the foreign state 
as their object/target? If so, would only war, occupation and other forms of military action 
relating to self- defence be covered, leaving outside the test other military action, for example 
that pursuant to Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter outside of self- defence, including for reasons concerned with the protection of human 
rights, and even action that is defensive, but of another state/population, not the state taking 
the action? 
 There is a potentially highly important linkage here between the legitimacy of deroga-
tions, of limiting rights in emergency situations, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of 
intervention/foreign war, occupation and other forms of military action, on the other, the 
latter normative question being addressed by other areas of international law (e.g. the law on 
the use of force, United Nations law) rather than human rights law (although the law of self- 
determination is clearly relevant here). At the root of the derogations regime is an assumption 
of entitlement on the part of the state to take extreme measures limiting rights, because of 
ideas associated with the legitimacy of the cause: that the state needs to be able to ensure its 
continued survival, to maintain the state institutions that protect the rights of its people.  82  
Equivalent ideas also underpin the international legal rules concerned with whether a state 
has the right to go to war in self- defence, unilaterally, without any multilateral approval.  83  
 That said, international law and public policy now enshrines, to a certain extent, the 
cosmopolitan notion of ‘community obligations’ which seek to move the position of states 
away from an exclusive concern with their own survival and that of their people, to also being 
interested in the welfare of others extraterritorially.  84  If a state acts abroad ostensibly on this 
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basis, for example to end gross violations of human rights, then a new ground for a legitimate 
‘threat’ as far as it is concerned – to another nation, or people, not itself at all, or at least not 
exclusively – is necessarily in play. Similarly, if a state acts pursuant to a request for assistance 
from another state, then the object of the threat this action relates to is necessarily ‘other’ than 
it. For international law to allow action of this kind as a matter of the law on the use of force 
and/or UN law, on the one hand, but then assume its illegitimacy in the law of human rights 
as far as the derogations test is concerned, on the other, would be perverse. 
 That said, whether and in what circumstances international law allows the use of force 
extraterritorially outside the context self- defence is a relatively contested and complex matter 
when compared to self- defence.  85  Many argue that the default position in international law is 
a limit to self- defence, with extraterritorial military action for other purposes, including to 
protect human rights, only permissible if Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter is forthcoming, and/or at the invitation of the state in whose territory the 
action is taken.  86  Here, then, the notion of the interest of ‘others’ – the ‘international commu-
nity’, the state in whose territory the action is taken – is promoted, but requiring a form of 
sanction derived from those identifi ed with this other interest – the Security Council in the 
case of the ‘international community’, the other state in the case of the invitation – in order 
for action pursuant to the interest to be lawful. It could be said, then, that a derogation regime 
which affi rms a default position of permissible limitations only for wars of self- defence would 
be compatible with a somewhat equivalent presumption, in terms of legitimate grounds, in 
the law on the use of force. 
 The question then would be how this default position could or would be departed from in 
circumstances where military action for non- self- defence purposes was lawfully conducted as 
a matter of the law on the use of force – through UN Security Council Chapter VII authority 
and/or agreement by the host state. This issue lay behind the  Al-Jedda case before the courts 
of England and Wales and the European Court of Human Rights, concerning the practice of 
security detention or internment by the UK military in Iraq.  87  The UK government had not 
entered a derogation to the ECHR relating to this or any other aspect of its military action in 
Iraq. It claimed that the Security Council had authorised it to conduct this practice as part of 
the broader mandate given to certain foreign forces in Iraq under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and that the authorisation had the legal effect of modifying any inconsistent obliga-
tions under the ECHR. Put differently, it was claimed that there was in the manner of what 
might be called a ‘constructive’ or ‘effective’ derogation (having an effect like a derogation 
but not operating through the derogation regime) enabled by Security Council authority. It 
was suggested that this was possible through Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, 
which provides that:
 In the event of a confl ict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.  88  
 The idea was that the supposed authorisation of internment made by the Security Council in 
a resolution passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, enjoying normative status as a 
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matter of UN law, constituted an ‘obligation’ under the Charter for Article 103 purposes, 
thereby trumping any confl icting obligations the UK had under the ECHR.  89  
 The European Court of Human Rights sidestepped the question of whether the Security 
Council might be able to make determinations with this legal effect in human rights law 
(including whether this was based on a correct interpretation of Article 103), by focusing on 
a prior matter: there was a presumption that the Security Council would not intend to modify 
member states’ human rights obligations, and this could not be rebutted when the supposed 
authority at issue was, as here, ambiguous.  90  
 The case did not, therefore, resolve the broader question of whether the Security Council 
can and should have the role the UK claimed it performed in  Al-Jedda , to perform an equivalent 
function in limiting human rights obligations in the context of extraterritorial security threats 
as derogation provisions play in the context of security threats in a state’s own territory – proac-
tive, ad hoc law- changing as a substitute for the operation of existing normative regulations. 
 One might begin to consider the answer to this question through a comparison in the 
different ways each normative regime would operate. The human rights regime operates as a 
regulatory framework grafted onto state behaviour, regardless, as addressed earlier, of whether 
or not the behaviour is itself pursuant to a legal entitlement more broadly in international law. 
It is, moreover, relational and context- specifi c in its application in any given case: is there an 
emergency, does it constitute a threat to the nation, is the restriction for a legitimate purpose, 
is it proportionate to that purpose and so on.  91  The Security Council authorisation regime, by 
contrast, is not regulatory and context- specifi c but authoritative and absolute in nature: the 
test is not whether or not the restriction is compatible with particular standards in the circum-
stances, but whether or not an entitlement to operate it has been granted by the Council. Is 
there something special about the extraterritorial context when compared to the territorial 
context that necessitates the operation of this different normative approach to the question of 
how restrictions on individual rights should be treated as a matter of law? More broadly, what 
are the relative merits of these two different legal strategies for legitimising restrictions on 
human rights? 
 It may be that the Security Council approach has only been considered because of a 
concern that the ‘life of the nation’ test in derogations law would be interpreted to cover only 
direct threats to the state acting extraterritorially. Accepting this view, the drastic step of 
seeking to argue that the Council could and did modify human rights obligations extrater-
ritorially could be seen as the only means of ensuring restrictions which might, in principle, 
have been compatible with human rights law,  mutatis mutandis , in the domestic context, but 
could not fi t within the test extraterritorially because the test itself did not encompass extra-
territorial situations. The law- making role asserted by the UN Security Council is deployed 
to remedy a defect in human rights treaty law: that the law on derogations cannot encompass 
extraterritorial situations. 
 It has to be asked how likely it is that courts and other authoritative interpretation bodies 
would defi ne the ‘life of the nation’ test so as to render the derogations regime incapable of 
fair and effective operation extraterritorially, thereby placing into question the viability of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law in general, even when, as addressed above, the 
latter issue has long been accepted and affi rmed by them. Is there a serious prospect of such 
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bodies adopting an approach to interpreting human rights law that would render inoperable 
to military action abroad the special regime of limitations conceived for emergency situa-
tions? Given the generous latitude that has been given to states by courts in applying the 
derogations rules, addressed further below,  92  it seems more probable that the ‘threat to the 
nation’ in the derogations test would be interpreted so as to encompass security threats faced 
by states acting extraterritorially. 
 However, bearing in mind the foregoing analysis on the links between the legitimacy of 
extraterritorial military action itself (the law on the use of force issue) and the legitimacy of 
restrictions on human rights taken in response to extraterritorial security threats (the deroga-
tions law issue), it may be that a court or other interpretation body considering the question 
of whether there is a ‘threat to the nation’ for the purposes of the law of derogations might 
deem it necessary to go into the cognate question of the legitimacy of the military action 
itself. This might be especially the case for military action outside of self- defence where, as 
reviewed earlier, there is a general view that international law requires special authority, 
whether through the consent of the host state or authorisation by the UN Security Council. 
 It might be argued that the human rights law ‘threat to the nation’ only covers threats that 
the state has the legal right to respond to: that the permissibility of an extra opportunity to 
limit rights (beyond the standard opportunity provided by limitation clauses) presupposes a 
legitimate entitlement to respond to the ‘emergency’ that supposedly provides the underlying 
rationale for the extra opportunity in the fi rst place.  93  Whereas with domestic security threats, 
such a right is, as reviewed earlier, assumed by a legal regime that accepts the state’s monopoly 
on the use of violence and affi rms its existential rationale to secure the kind of ordered society 
within which rights can be protected. For extraterritorial security threats, however, there is 
no such assumption outside of self-defence. A court might be persuaded to take the view that 
a state taking military action extraterritorially in order to respond to a non- self-defence 
threat would need to establish its legal entitlement to do so in order to be able to avail itself 
of the derogation provisions of human rights law. 
 Earlier, it was remarked that it would be perverse for one area of international law – the 
law on the use of force – to permit certain forms of extraterritorial military action, but then 
another area of international law – human rights law – to operate (in the derogations rules) as 
if such action lacked legitimacy. Equally, it might be said that it would be peculiar if military 
action that was illegal as a matter of the law on the use of force would be treated as legitimate 
when it came to the operation of human rights law, in the particular sense that the state taking 
the action, although actually lacking a lawful basis for doing so, would be granted extra privi-
leges to restrict rights on the basis that it has a legitimate role in responding to a security 
threat. 
 The upshot of an approach that would graft the law on the use of force onto an aspect of 
the law of derogations would be that a state taking extraterritorial military action would only 
be able to avail itself of the operation of the derogations regime in international human rights 
law if the action at issue was lawful as a matter of the law on the use of force. This takes things 
back to the earlier discussion of the link with the concept of ‘ jurisdiction’ in general public 
international law: the point that human rights law applies extraterritorially regardless of 
whether the state action at issue is or is not lawful as a matter of general international law. 
Here, it is not that human rights law would not apply if the state has no lawful right to be 
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acting extraterritorially; rather, the state would not be able to benefi t from the extra ability 
to restrict rights provided by the derogations regime in particular. In other words, it is, as it 
were, the applicability of the derogations regime that would be contingent on the broader 
legality of the extraterritorial action at issue; the applicability of human rights law in a general 
sense would be unaffected by the wider question of legality. 
 This approach would create a signifi cant new issue for those states that engage in military 
action extraterritorially and which are subject to the kind of judicial scrutiny of conformity 
to human rights law through national and international mechanisms that is of a more 
pronounced character when compared to the nature of such scrutiny when the application of 
the law on the use of force is concerned. Of course, for states seeking to avoid judicial scrutiny 
of the lawfulness of military action by courts applying human rights law, the alternative route 
to legal justifi cation of Security Council authority – such as it is, actually, possible – can be 
seen as offering a way to restrict rights without having the ‘threat to the life of the nation’ test 
in derogations law considered. In one sense there is an irony in such an approach, in that a 
body with primary responsibility for issues of international peace and security, and so the 
international law rules on the use of force, can supposedly be deployed in an attempt to 
modify another area of international law – human rights law – in a manner that could ensure 
that other bodies that have a primary responsibility for the enforcement of that other area of 
international law – human rights courts – do not stray into the law on the use of force as part 
of their analysis. The UK lost in  Al-Jedda on the narrow question of the lawfulness of security 
detentions/internment in Iraq. However, in its strategy of framing this question as being a 
matter of whether authority had been forthcoming from the UN Security Council, the UK 
avoided the risk of the considerably broader question of the legality of its military presence in 
Iraq being brought before the Court as part of a consideration of the law of derogations. 
 5.3 The ‘legal black hole’ – what is at stake? 
 As mentioned earlier, the issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights law has 
become foregrounded by the popular concern that certain extraterritorial arrangements – the 
most prominently invoked situation being the US detention and interrogation facilities in 
Guantánamo Bay – constitute ‘legal black holes’, and that this situation is problematic in a 
fashion that justifi es an important, sometimes pre- eminent, position on the agenda of global 
human rights concerns. What are the merits of this portrayal of the question of whether inter-
national human rights law should apply extraterritorially? 
 The notion that the facility in Guantánamo Bay, and other forms of extraterritorial activi-
ties by foreign states, are legal vacuums is absurd: the states involved in them claim that the 
law plays a major role in constituting these arrangements. In Guantánamo, for example, most 
fundamentally international law provides, through treaties between Cuba and the US, the 
entitlement of the US to administer the area on which it operates the Naval Base housing the 
detainees.  94  In Iraq, the site of the Abu Ghraib abuses that also led to ‘legal vacuum’ concerns, 
and the actions of UK soldiers that led to the  Al-Skeini  and  Al-Jedda  decisions addressed above 
that form part of some of the canonical case law in this area, UN Security Council resolu-
tions, and later agreements with the post- occupation Iraqi government, were invoked by the 
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foreign military powers in their claim to a lawful entitlement to engage in the invasion, occu-
pation and post- occupation military presence in the state.  95  
 As scholars such as Susan Marks point out, representing situations like Guantánamo as 
lacking law as a mode of criticism is problematic: the role of the law in potentially facilitating 
these situations is concealed.  96  In what in critical theory – specifi cally, ideology critique – is 
termed a ‘strategy of inversion’, such representations suggest that with the application of 
law these problematic situations will be brought to an end. The portrayal is descriptively 
inaccurate and normatively problematic, implying a political role for the law in relation to 
such situations different from that which it actually performs. By way of what is termed 
‘dissimulation’ in critical theory, the law is presented in an inherently redemptive rather than 
normatively complex and ambivalent manner. 
 That said, despite the absolutist implication of terms like ‘legal black hole,’ as mentioned 
earlier such terms are mostly invoked to articulate a concern with the absence of not all law 
but a particular area of it: the full range of necessary legal standards that should apply when-
ever the state exercises control over territory and the individuals within it, including those 
standards governing the detention of individuals, and independent remedies for enforcing 
those standards. As a term of critique, the ‘legal black hole’ idea speaks to a fear that, when 
states move away from their own sovereign territories, they somehow also effect a partial or 
complete move away from the arena of necessary legal regulation as far as the treatment of 
individuals is concerned. 
 This constitutes one of the main arguments implicated in the question of whether human 
rights law should apply extraterritorially: the notion that a ‘legal black hole’ of this nature 
would otherwise prevail, that such a situation is undesirable, and so efforts – political, activist, 
judicial – to remedy such a situation are meritorious. 
 Indeed, some of the advocacy in this area comes close to suggesting that international 
human rights law is somehow the pre- eminent means of realising effective checks and 
balances against states; that all it would take to bring an end to certain objectionable practices 
is the application and enforcement of international human rights law. Here, then, is the 
general redemptionist idea earlier associated with all law applied to human rights law, which 
is invested with a transformatory capacity. 
 This is a diffi cult thesis to maintain, given the various devices that exist within human 
rights law permitting the state to limit rights, from the attenuated way rights themselves are 
defi ned, to reservations, restriction clauses, derogation provisions and the concept mentioned 
earlier of the ‘margin of appreciation’, through which the state’s own view of what limitations 
on rights are necessary is deferred to.  97  
 Even for non- derogable rules like the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment there is debate about which practices fall within the scope of what is prohibited.  98  
The rules concerning the application of human rights in emergency situations have been 
criticised for according too much latitude to states because of the generous interpretations of 
derogation provisions made by international review mechanisms, especially the ECHR 
Ralph Wilde
658
  99  See the citations above nn. 77 and 80, and the sources cited therein. 
 100  On the expert panel, see UN Commission on Human Rights,  Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay – Report , UN doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, 15 February 2006, obtainable from  http://www.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/sessions/62/listdocs.htm , para. 95. 
 101  See, e.g. symposium edition Security Detention in (2009) 40(3)  Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 315, and sources cited therein. 
 102  See ECHR (n. 17), Art. 34. 
 103  Because the US has not ratifi ed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allowing for this. See ICCPR 
Optional Protocol 1 (n. 79). 
 104  See ICCPR (n. 20), Art. 40. 
Strasbourg machinery with its invocation of a broad ‘margin of appreciation’ involving defer-
ence to states’ own decisions as to the existence of an ‘emergency’ situation and the necessity 
and proportionality of restrictions introduced to respond to this threat.  99  The challenge here 
is whether the inadequate nature of the test applied to state action renders this area of the law 
incapable of delivering what it promises, thereby serving ironically to legitimate infringe-
ments on individual rights without having actually placed the states involved under any 
meaningful constraints. 
 One cannot help wondering, then, whether the application of human rights law extra-
territorially fully addresses the political objectives that lead those calling for it to make their 
arguments. For example, would international human rights law properly applied actually 
require the US to release or prosecute all the detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Bagram and 
other extraterritorial detention and interrogation centres, the policy that has been advocated 
by most mainstream opponents and an expert panel in its report to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights?  100  Not only does the call to ‘release or prosecute’ perhaps 
miss the point of many of the Guantánamo detentions; it is far from clear that some form of 
security detention would necessarily be impermissible in international human rights law.  101  
Critics may thus be placing faith in a normative regime that even on its own terms may not 
speak fully to their agenda. 
 Alongside concerns relating to the substantive content of international human rights law 
are other worries relating to the value of this regime of law as an effective review mechanism, 
notably relating to enforcement. Whereas the European Court of Human Rights can hear 
complaints from individuals against all Council of Europe member states,  102  many of whom 
being engaged in extraterritorial activity, the UN Human Rights Committee’s (somewhat) 
equivalent jurisdiction of issuing Views on individual communications making complaints 
about non- compliance with the ICCPR does not operate with respect to the United States 
nor to some other states acting extraterritorially.  103  And even when some form of scrutiny 
mechanism does operate, for example through the reporting procedure to the Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR,  104  the limited remit of some country- specifi c NGOs can mean 
that the crucial assistance role that NGOs play in the operation of human rights mechanisms 
can be relatively minimal when extraterritorial activity is under evaluation. 
 Beyond these and other limitations with the law, the nature of extraterritorial activities 
means that many of them take place in conditions of near total secrecy. Whatever the truth of 
the ‘legal black hole’ designations, it is certainly true that certain extraterritorial activities 
take place in circumstances where the opportunities for scrutiny by third parties are markedly 
constrained and sometimes entirely absent. In the light of these concerns, one should not be 
too sanguine as to the value of international human rights law to provide meaningful and 
effective review of extraterritorial state action. 
659
The extraterritorial application of international human rights law on civil and political rights
 105  See the sources cited above n. 98. On the absolute nature of the prohibition on torture, see e.g. 
Nigel S. Rodley with Matt Pollard,  The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law , 3rd edn 
(OUP, 2013), ch. 2, and sources cited therein. 
 106  For an excellent review of many of the main critiques of international human rights law, see 
Frédéric Mégrét, ‘Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Law Stand? An 
Exploration in 18 Vignettes’, in David Kennedy and José María Benyeto (eds),  New Approaches to 
International Law: Lessons from the European experience  (TMC Asser Press, 2012). 
 107  See, e.g., M. Westerhaus and A. Castro, ‘How Do Intellectual Property Law and International Trade 
Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral Therapy?’, (2006) 3(8)  PLoS Med : e332, obtainable 
from  http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030332 . 
 That said, is there not a legitimate purpose to calling for the application of human rights 
law even without an exaggerated view of the difference it would make? Even allowing for 
concerns about the derogation test, for example, at a bare minimum the law here still provides 
an absolute prohibition on breaches of non- derogable rights such as the right to be free from 
torture.  105  
 It is also signifi cant that, as mentioned earlier, certain states seek to deny the applicability 
of human rights treaties: this would surely be unnecessary if such states considered the 
substantive content of these instruments and/or the associated modes of enforcement as 
placing them under no meaningful constraint. 
 It should be asked how helpful it is to seek to counter the essentialism that the application 
of human rights law would bring about a transformation in the fate of people subject to the 
extraterritorial actions of states with its opposite, that such application would be of no benefi t 
whatsoever. Another option exists, of course, which is to be concerned with extraterritorial 
applicability as a modest initiative to serve certain policy objectives. 
 In assessing the merits of such a position, one must place the particular set of policy 
concerns at issue in a broader context, and consider the validity of focusing on them in the 
light of what is left outside the frame of analysis. The operation of extraterritorial detention 
facilities and the conduct of military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq form part of a broader 
process of the projection of power abroad by states and the complex interrelationship between 
the activities of powerful states and the welfare of individuals outside their territory. 
 One might ask what is at stake when what was even at the high point a situation involving 
only a few hundred men in Guantánamo seemed to occupy a more prominent position as a 
global human rights cause célèbre than, for example, the tens of millions of women, men and 
children infected with HIV in developing countries who lack access to affordable anti- 
retroviral drugs. This focus implicates the skewed agenda of much mainstream human rights 
policy, with its pattern of dominant and subaltern issues: the focus on civil and political rights 
more than economic, social and cultural rights (as refl ected in this chapter); on the excep-
tional and the extreme more than the pervasive and everyday; on the male more than the 
female; on the public more than the private; and on particularly dramatic incidents more than 
broader, long- term structural problems.  106  
 This skewed agenda takes things back to the earlier point about the ideological representa-
tion of international law. When one moves beyond the law’s role in offering some safeguards, 
for example the right to a public enquiry established in  Al-Skeini , one sees the law, for 
example, having initially been invoked as a bar preventing the production of affordable 
generic HIV anti- retroviral drugs through intellectual property rights.  107  
 Not only, then, could it be said that the fetishisation of the arrangements in Guantánamo 
and other situations involving extreme violations of civil and political rights reinforce the 
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unjustifi ed dominance of certain political causes over others. Also, a greater focus on an area 
of public policy where to a certain extent the law may make a positive difference, albeit a 
marginal one, when compared to the level of focus on an issue where the law may be more 
squarely part of the problem, brings with it the risk, as in the aforementioned use of the term 
‘legal black hole’, of fostering a misleading presentation of the role of law as necessarily 
redemptive. 
 Indeed, it would be an irony if the silence or active support of the law on many of the most 
important causes of human misery in today’s world has led to a strategy to turn away from 
these causes to relatively minor human rights problems like the situation of a few hundred 
men in Guantánamo, because it is here that the law might make more of a positive difference; 
in other words, for a broader political agenda on human rights to be determined by what is 
realisable through the law. Another approach to this problem would of course be to step 
outside the worldview of the law and be freed of its limitations. 
 To a certain extent, though, this challenge relates to matters internal to the law, which can 
be addressed within it. The problem that issues concerned with the civil rights of a few 
hundred men in Guantánamo seemed to be given greater attention than the right to health of 
tens of millions of women, men and children infected with HIV could be countered by a 
greater focus on the extraterritorial applicability of those areas of human rights law concerned 
with economic, social and cultural rights.  108  Equally, the problem that international legal 
standards concerned with intellectual property were operating as an impediment to the 
production of affordable anti- retroviral drugs for people in the global south could be, and is 
being, countered by initiatives to change this area of international law.  109  
 But an internal recalibration of priorities within a law- determined agenda still ultimately 
retains the limitations of such an agenda. There is no escape from a need to be more modest 
in the claims made about the value of the law, acknowledging its potential to make differences 
in certain discrete areas, but not holding it out to be more than it is worth, as somehow a 
substitute for the more complex and broad- ranging business of transforming the political 
culture both nationally and internationally in order to create greater transparency and 
accountability in relation to state actions overseas. A consideration of the applicability of 
international human rights law may ultimately be a valid response to the need for greater 
scrutiny of extraterritorial action, provided that as such it is understood to be but one rela-
tively minor part of a much wider necessary initiative. Such broader political ideas are being 
generated and movements being built around them, but to rely on that and continue to focus 
on legal strategies is, in one sense, perverse: free- riding on work by others addressing ulti-
mately more signifi cant matters, in favour of work focusing on relatively marginal issues. 
Moreover, this does nothing to challenge, and indeed may worsen, the dominance within 
parts of the mainstream human rights policy agenda of issues peripheral to the lives of most 
people in the world. 
 6 Conclusion 
 Whether and to what extent states bear international legal obligations with respect to the civil 
and political rights of people outside their sovereign territories has been subject to piecemeal 
treatment by certain courts such as the International Court of Justice and European Court of 
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Human Rights, and other interpretative bodies such as the UN Committee on Human 
Rights. This chapter has sought to identify and critically evaluate the signifi cance of the 
general concepts potentially suggested in these key texts, as well as some of the broader 
political ideas which underpin the general topic and illuminate what is at stake when choices 
are made as to the legal approaches to it. Much remains unclear, and the scope for the norma-
tive regime to develop in the future, as new situations are addressed and the ideas in existing 
texts are revisited, challenged and built upon, is signifi cant. 
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